|
Post by Alon on May 30, 2017 10:19:48 GMT
I face some difficulty with problem 2.1.c. Let A be an algorithm . The first price p1 set by A can be seen as a constant (it is independent of the players bids), so let's say that p1=5. Consider players with v_1=...=v_{n-1}=6 and v_n = 10^9. With probability (n-1)/n, the first bid is 6, and since 6>5 the auction is completed with welfare 6. What am I missing?
|
|
|
Post by Admin on Jun 5, 2017 18:38:54 GMT
Hi Alon, thanks for your question. Your auction is also allowed to set a price of +infinity (i.e., to refuse to sell) to a bidder, if desired. Does this help clarify what the solution should look like? (See also the hint in the back of the book.)
Best, Tim Roughgarden
|
|
|
Post by Alon on Jun 7, 2017 5:57:08 GMT
Thanks Tim. Everything is clear now
|
|